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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of the EU preferential trade agreement of Everything but Arms 
on the extensive and intensive margins of exports of least developed countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The extensive margin is defined as the quantity of exported products while the intensive 
margin is defined as the value of exported products. The study employs the difference-in-
difference estimator together with fixed effects for a country bilateral product data defined at the 
HS 6-digit level to investigate the impact for the period 1995-2015. The findings are that the EBA 
has not had any impact on both trade margins of LDCs in SSA although it has impacted positively 
on some specific industries. The study goes further to explain how the LDCs in SSA could benefit 
from the EBA through complementary policies.  
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1.0 Introduction 
This study looks at the impact of the European Commission’s (EC) Everything but Arms (EBA) 
preferential trade arrangement on the extensive margin and intensive margin of exports of Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) at the country and product levels. It 
investigates the extent to which the total liberalisation of the European common market in terms 
of full tariff and quota removal has impacted on the market access of products originating from 
LDCs located in SSA. Furthermore, the study examines the role that complementary economic 
policies play in ensuring that Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) and specifically the EBA 
affects positively the trade margins of LDCs. 
Following, the EC’s commitment to fulfilling the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) resolution to increasing the participation of developing countries in 
international trade, the EC as part of their Generalized System of Preference policy introduced the 
EBA as a one-way PTA to give 49 LDCs duty free and quota free market access in all European 
Union (EU) member countries for all goods originating from the LDCs except arms and 
ammunitions. The notion of using tariff removal or other types of trade liberalisation as done in 
the EBA is consistent with economic theory and is confirmed by several theoretical and empirical 
studies. Among the studies that confirm this is (Sala, Schroder, & Yalcin, 2010) which explains 
that tariffs are a major obstacle to foreign firms or products such that it makes it difficult for foreign 
firms and products to compete with domestically produced products. As a result, tariff cuts reduce 
risk of destination markets and this has a substantial impact on trade and country welfare as the 
reduction of risk alter the expected profits flows and thus affects the entry calculations of potential 
exporters. (Buono & Lalanne, 2012) confirm this empirically by showing that more firms export 
where tariff are lower. The EBA thus has the potential to influence export flows from LDCs to the 
European common market. 
The support of the EBA by economic theory coupled with the expectations from both sides of the 
EBA agreement makes it an interesting case to investigate. The study thus employs a country 
bilateral data for all products exported by LDCs in SSA to the European common market in terms 
of their quantity measured in tons and their value measured in US dollars to estimate the impact 
of the EBA on the extensive and intensive margins of LDCs in SSA. The study uses the quasi 
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natural experiment methodology of difference-in-difference with the SSA LDCs being the 
treatment group and the other SSA countries, the control group to study the impact of the EBA for 
the period 1995-2015. The period of study coincides with the beginning of collection of the most 
detailed product description of exports to the latest available year. It is also chosen to allow for the 
use of the difference-in-difference methodology which requires information about the pre -
treatment and post treatment performance of both the control and treatment groups. Also, the 
period of time is chosen to allow for better results following (Baier, Bergstrand, & Feng, 2014) 
who explains that the full impact of economic integration agreements on bilateral trade flows could 
take as many as 10-15 years to realize.   
 The definitions of the extensive and intensive margin follow (Disdier, Fontagné, & Mimouni, 
2013) who defined the extensive margin as the quantity of products exported and the intensive 
margin as the value of exported products to study the effects of tariff liberalisation at the product 
destination level. The two margins of trade as defined above are very important in that, they are 
crucial factors for export growth. The extensive margin is said to be more crucial as it contributes 
more to export especially for developing countries (Besedeš & Prusa, 2011). They are also the 
trade creating channels as explained by (Foster-McGregor, Pöschl, & Stehrer, 2010) and (Bensassi, 
Márquez-Ramos, & Martínez-Zarzoso, 2010). 
The study finds no significant impact of the EBA on neither the extensive margin nor the intensive 
margin at both the country and product levels. That notwithstanding, the study finds heterogenous 
impact for different countries and industries. The main findings are consistent with (Spilker et al., 
2017) and (Gamberoni, 2007) both of which studied the impact of a PTAs on the export trade 
margins of developing countries including LDCs. Together with the findings above the study 
reveals the need for improvements in complementary policy if SS LDCs are to benefit from the 
EBA.  
 
1.1 Review of Related Literature 
The impact of PTAs on the extensive and intensive margins of trade has been widely studied in 
economic trade literature by means of different datasets and variables and as well as different 
econometric techniques and methodology. These studies have been PTA specific such as the GSP 
and the EBA while others have been general without any specific context. The findings of most of 
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these studies show both consistent and verifiable results which are in tandem with economic trade 
theory. Other findings have been controversial and have deviated from the predictions of economic 
theory and reasoning. The literature differs in some other ways too especially in their definition of 
the both margins of trade. This section provides the review of related empirical literature 
surrounding the subject matter. 
The impact of PTAs including one-way and two-way PTAs and a number of economic integration 
agreements on the extensive and intensive margins of trade were studied by (Baier et al., 2014) 
using the gravity model and panel data methodologies of fixed effects for the period 1962-2000. 
They found that one-way PTAs have had negative but insignificant impact on the extensive margin 
of export while having a positive and significant impact on the intensive margin of export. By 
defining the extensive margin as the as the number of exporting firms and the number of products 
exported per firm and the intensive margin as export volumes per firm and per product (Spilker et 
al., 2017) investigated how Costa Rica’s exports have been impacted by their entry into the 
Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFT-DR) using 
panel data methodologies with poisson regressions and difference-in-difference for the period 
2000-2010. The findings reveal that CAFT-DR PTA has had no impact on the extensive and 
intensive margins at both the firm and product levels of analyses.  
In the paper “ Do Unilateral Trade Preferences help Export Diversification ?” (Gamberoni, 2007) 
measured the intensive margin as the value of trade of existing exporters and the extensive margin 
as the appearance and disappearance of exported products and investigated the impact of EU 
unilateral trade preferences on both margins of general and agricultural products for 118 countries 
during the period 1994-2005 using the gravity model together with the tobit and probit 
methodologies. The findings are that unilateral preferences for LDCs in general have not impacted 
on exports from LDCs. However, they have impacted positively on the two margins for 
agricultural products. In terms of specifics, the GSP and the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) 
preferential treatment of the EU has had negative impacts on both export margins. (Gradeva & 
Martínez-Zarzoso, 2009) have specifically studied the impact of the EBA on export performance 
of LDCs and the comparison of the impact of the EBA with that of official Development 
Assistance (ODA) for the years 1995-2005 using 3 different econometric specifications namely 
panel data random and fixed effects estimators, the Hausman-Taylor estimator and the Heckman 
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regression model all of which reveal a poor performance of ACP overall exports under the EBA 
such that the size of ACP exports have decreased due to the EBA.  
Irrespective of the largely negative and insignificant results generated by some studies of the 
subject matter, other studies have come out with positive results that are consistent with economic 
theory. These include  (Foster-McGregor et al., 2010) who examined the impact of PTA 
membership on the volume and variety of exports for several countries for the period 1962-2000 
using the gravity model together with the quasi natural experiment methodologies of difference-
in-difference and matching. They find that exports are positively linked to PTAs especially the 
extensive margin and that PTAs are trade creating. (Scoppola, Raimondi, & Olper, 2013) 
reinforces this through their study of the impact of EU preferential policies on the extensive and 
intensive margins of trade in the agricultural and food industries of 173 exporting countries for the 
period 1990-2006. They rely on gravity equations together with ordinary least square, the 
Heckman selection model, and pseudo-maximum likelihood estimators to reveal that PTAs 
positively affect agricultural products at the extensive margin through measures other than tariffs. 
The intensive margins of the agricultural and food industries are not affected by policies other than 
tariffs. Finally, (Bensassi et al., 2010) sought to provide empirical evidence of PTAs on the two 
trade margins using the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (EuroMed) as the setting. They employ 
the gravity model and panel data methodologies to investigate the topic for the period 1995-2008 
and conclude that EuroMed positively and significantly affect both extensive margin and intensive 
margin which they define as the number of unique shipments and average value per shipment 
respectfully. They further reveal that the impact is positive and significant only for some sectors 
and that the general impact differs from country to country. 
From the review of related literature, it is evident that the reduction and best the removal of trade 
protection at destination markets impacts on the export margins of trade. Since these two margins 
have been identified to be more important for the export growth of developing countries, a category 
which includes the LDCs, it becomes essential to study the case for these countries as the growth 
of the intensive margin might not be as beneficial as the extensive margin. The subject matter 
becomes very important even now as there has been new trade deals between the EC and some 
regions in SSA among which most of the LDCs belong to. The outcomes of the impacts of the 
EBA will be very important for the success of these new programmes that hope to use increased 
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foreign market access to influence export and consequently economic growth. Knowing the impact 
of the EBA on LDCs exports will be relevant for policy making to derive maximum benefits from 
the programme and other similar PTAs now and the near future.  
The specific case of export contents and firm characteristics of African countries especially the 
LDCs makes it very interesting to investigate the impact of the EBA. LDC firms are usually small 
and informal as well as lack the technical capacity to perform well among other inefficiencies. 
This makes it very interesting to investigate the case of the LDCs to know if they will respond in 
the very same way that other non LDC countries have responded to tariff cuts on their export 
destination markets. The prices of some exports of LDCs are also determined on the world market 
such that tariffs may not be the only factor that determines their market access but their prices as 
well. From the above, it becomes very interesting to investigate the impact of the EBA on the 
margins of trade of LDCs in SSA.  
 
1.2 Objective of the Study 
The aim of the study is thus to investigate the impact of the EBA tariff and quota removal at the 
country and product levels. Specifically, it seeks to know the impact of the EBA on the extensive 
and intensive margins of LDCs in Africa using a difference-in-difference approach.  
The study shall add to the existing literature surrounding the subject matter as it is the only study 
dedicated to finding the impact of EBA on the extensive and intensive margins of exports of LDCs 
in SSA. It is also the first to use a difference-in-difference methodology to examine any sort of 
impact of the EBA. The findings of this study will be of importance to policy makers’ especially 
those of LDCs as it will afford them the opportunity to improve on their export growth and to 
development partners of LDCs to know of further actions to take towards helping the development 
agenda of LDCs.   
The rest of the study is organized as follows; focus on Everything but Arms, data and data source, 
descriptive statistics and analyses of SSA Exports which seeks to throw lights on the dynamics of 
SSA exports. These are followed by the methodology, the econometric specification of the model, 
results, policy recommendation, limitations of the study, prospects for future studies, and 
conclusion. 
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1.3 Everything but Arms (EBA) 
Under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) initiative agreed in 1968 at the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), developed countries were tasked to extend 
unilateral and non-reciprocal preferential trade treatment to developing countries. Among the 
several GSPs that emerged out of the UNCTAD agreement is the European Union (EU) GSP. 
According to the European Commission (EC) trade portal of the GSP updated on the 24th day of 
February 2017 the GSP “allows developing countries to pay less or no duties on their exports to 
the EU”. The GSP thus “gives them vital access to EU markets and contributes to their economic 
growth”.  
The EU GSP however, applies to a select list of product lines to which total or partial tariff  ad 
quota removal are applied. In all about two-thirds of product lines originating from developing 
countries fall under the general GSP programme. The EU GSP is however a dynamic policy, in 
that it is subject to changes such that based on the competitiveness of the product line, the product 
could be withdrawn from the list of supported product lines. Also under the EU GSP are special 
arrangements including arrangements that provides additional tariff reductions for countries that 
adhere to international labour rights standards as enshrined by the international Labour 
Organisation as well as international environmental standards. These extra arrangements under the 
EU GSP are therefore conditional and developing countries that want to benefit of it are required 
to apply to the EU for consideration. Their request is granted or denied following a thorough study 
of their specific case by authorities of the EC. The general EU GSP programme is thus limited in 
terms of product scope and country qualification.     
Starting the 5th of March 2001, the European Commission introduced the Everything but Arms 
(EBA) arrangement under the EU GSP. The EBA is a special arrangement made under the GSP 
exceptionally for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) according to the United Nations 
Classification of countries based on the socio economic and human development level of countries. 
Countries with the least development ratings fall under the LDC banner. The EBA is different 
from the standard GSP arrangement such that it is not time restricted and that countries benefit of 
it in so far as they remain or become LDCs. The objective of the EBA arrangement according to 
its originators is to” facilitate the integration of least developed countries in the world economy 
and in international trade as well as to promote economic growth in countries and well-being 
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among people”. Currently, there are 49 LDCs across the globe with most of them, approximately 
34 found in the Sub-Saharan region of Africa (SSA).   Nine of the LDCs are found on the Asian 
continent, 5 in the Australian and Pacific region and 1 in the Caribbean. The number of LCDs has 
increased by 1 from the start date of the EBA with the inclusion of Senegal which became an LDC 
in 2002 having accepted a downgrading to LDC status. 
 
According to an EC press release issued in Brussels on the 7th of February 2001, and numbered 
IP/01/116, the EBA provides full access to the EU common market for all goods originating from 
LDCs except arms. As detailed in the press release, all goods coming from LDC starting from the 
commencement year of the arrangement will be subject to total liberalisation in the sense of duty 
free and quota free access to the European common market. 
 
Even though the EBA arrangement allows for all products but arms to be exported into the EU 
market, three (3) sensitive products namely Sugar, Rice and Fresh Bananas were exempted from 
full liberalisation until later. The 3 products were subject to Zero tariffs but still restricted in terms 
of the quantity that could be exported to the EU common market. These quota regimes were 
however transitional and were fully removed in 2006 for fresh Bananas and 2009 for both Rice 
and Sugar. A study titled “Post-Quota EU Sugar Sector” published by the Directorate-General of 
Internal Policies of the EC to the European Parliament in 2016 reveals several reasons for which 
sugar as a commodity was subject to a quota regime until the 1st of July 2009. According to the 
referenced document, sugar is of great economic and environmental importance to most 
agricultural regions of the EU such that its immediate liberalisation would create economic, social 
and environmental shocks. It cites reasons of employment and income, animal feed, source of 
energy, food security, need to sustain biodiversity as well as need to keep agricultural land in good 
condition as reasons for which the product could not be liberalized immediately. Sugar was hence 
protected from the LDCs between 2001 and 2006 and gradually liberalized with increased quota 
for LDCs after 2006. It was fully liberalized for the LDCs in 2009. Similar arguments hold for 
both Banana and Rice. 
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2.0 Data and Data Sources 
In response to the objectives of the study, the study uses the Base pour l’Analyse du Commerce 
International (BACI, 2015) data by the French Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales and constructed by (Gaulier & Zignago, 2010). The BACI database comprises the 
reconciled version of country bilateral exports and imports reported to the Trade Statistics Branch 
of the United Nations Statistics Division and used in the United Nations COMTRADE database. 
Overall, the database has information on the bilateral export values and quantities for more than 
200 countries and 5000 different products.  The bilateral export values and quantities are measured 
in thousands of US dollars and in tons respectfully. Products are classified at the World Custom 
Organization’s Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit level which is the most standard and detailed 
product definition.  
 
3.0 Descriptive Statistics 
From the selected study period and countries, there are 4797 uniquely identified products exported 
by the selected 42 countries in SSA to the EU 15. Of the total number of uniquely identified 
products, 4559 products were exported by the EBA treated countries while the non EBA treated 
countries exported 4555 different products. A total of 4390 different products were exported by 
the two groups of countries before the introduction of the EBA in 2001. The number of exported 
products increased to 4637 the years after the implementation of the EBA by both group of 
countries. The treated countries exported a total of 4342 different products after the 
implementation of EBA. This is however lower than the number of different products they 
exported prior to the start of the EBA.  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the two key variables of interest; Export Quantity which 
measures the extensive margin of export, and Export Value which measures the intensive margin 
of export. The table shows specific statistics of mean and standard deviation for all countries of 
SSA included in the study and by group classification according to their EBA treatment status. In 
all there are 528,648 bilateral observations of which 265,977 belong to the treated countries while 
the remaining 262,671 belong to the non-treated countries. 
 
12 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Export Quantity and Value by Treated and Non-Treated Countries 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Column 1 indicates the mean and standard deviation of quantity and value of exports for the full 
sample of countries used for the study. The average value of products exported to the EU 15 by 
the full sample of countries for the period 1995-2015 is 1710.487 thousand US Dollars while the 
average quantity of product quantity exported is 3388.64 tons. This suggests that the quantity of 
products exported is about two times the value of the products exported by the full sample of 
countries involved in the studies and as such SSA countries export products which are likely to be 
of lower value relative to their quantities. For both margins, a little more than half of the mean are 
due to the exports of SSA LDCs included in the EBA arrangement whiles the remaining 
contribution comes from the rest of SSA countries that are included in the study.   The Standard 
deviation statistic measures how much the countries in the full sample of study differ from the 
mean values of export values and quantity. It shows that country’s export quantities and associated 
values are very large and far from the mean of export value and quantity. This means that there 
are a wide range of values for both margins and that they are spread out from the mean values. 
Specifically, the standard deviation of export value shows that most of the export value 
observations are 42719.56 thousand US dollars more and less of the mean value of 1710.487 
thousand US dollars.  
Columns 2 and 3 show the mean and standard deviations for the treated countries and non-treated 
countries respectfully. The average export value of all products exported by the EBA countries to 
the EU 15 from 1995 to 2015 is 1199.323. This is roughly about a half of the average of export 
                                                                                          
N                  528648                    265977                    262671             
                                                                                          
EBA              .5031268     .4999907                                                    
Quantity          3388.64     113372.8     2920.535     114034.5     3864.132       112695
Value            1710.487     42719.56     1199.323     26945.69     2228.084     54195.53
                                                                                          
                     mean           sd         mean           sd         mean           sd
                      All                   Treated                NonTreated             
                      (1)                       (2)                       (3)             
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value of all products exported by the EBA non-treated countries in SSA which is approximately 
2228.084 thousand US dollars. For export quantity, the non-treated countries exported a total of 
3864.132 tons of products which is more than the quantity exported by the EBA treated countries 
which is 2920.535 tons. As indicated by the standard deviation, the export value of products 
exported by the non-treated countries are highly spread away from their average values than that 
of the treated countries. For export quantity, the extent of variation from the mean for both groups 
are almost equal with treated countries having a standard deviation of 114034.5 and non-treated 
countries having a figure of 112695.   
 
3.1 Analyses of SSA Export Products  
Figure 1 shows the mean values of products exported by SSA countries measured by their 
monetary value and quantity from 1995-2015. The value of all products exported by SSA countries 
has increased over time since 1995 except in 2009 and 2010 possibly due to the global financial 
crises which caused EU 15 countries to reduce their import of products originating from all parts 
of the world including SSA. The value of exported products from SSA to EU 15 increased soon 
after 2010 to its highest level in 2011 and 2012 amongst the years under consideration. 
Nevertheless, the value of SSA exported products to EU 15 fell to the lowest level in four years in 
2015. The quantity of products exported by SSA countries to the EU 15 has been volatile and 
highly undulating across the period of study.  The quantity of exported products has experienced 
peaks in 1997, 2013, and 2015. The year 2014 recorded the highest number of product quantity 
exported by SSA to the European common market. The years 2004 recorded the lowest number of 
product quantity exported by SSA to the EU 15. Contrary to the experiences with products values 
in the years of the global financial crises, the quantity of products exported to the EU 15 by SSA 
countries were rather higher. Overall, across time, the quantity of products exported by SSA 
countries to the EU 15 is greater than their corresponding monetary value. This suggests that SSA 
countries export mostly lower value products even though they export more in quantity 
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Figure 1: SSA Export Product Quantity and Value by Year 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Figures 2 and 3 below illustrate the quantity and value of all products exported from SSA to the 
EU 15 by LDCs and non LDCs for the period of study. With reference to figure 2, most LDCs in 
SSA export relatively small quantity of products which are of lower value compared to the non 
LDC countries in SSA. The only exceptions are Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Liberia, 
Mauritania, and Mozambique whose exported product quantity and values are comparable to those 
of the non LDC SSA countries as shown by figure 3.  Once again, value of exported products is 
more than the quantity of the exported products for both groups of countries. Among the non LDC 
Countries, Nigeria is a super high exporter of products that tend to have very high monetary value 
as well. The quantity and value of Nigerian exports are about four to five times more than the 
exports of all the countries in both the LDC and group of non LDC countries. Most of the countries 
are very much comparable to the LDCs in terms of the value and quantity of products they export 
to the EU 15. As a matter of fact, they export products quantities and product values that are far 
less those exported by the top exporters in the group of SSA LDC countries. 
Although the EU 15 is a common market, member countries differ in several ways. These 
differences between the EU 15 countries could be due to differences in their individual economy  
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Figure 2: SSA LDCs Product Exports in Quantity and Value 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Figure 3: SSA Non LDCs Product Exports in Quantity and Value 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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including differences in income as well as differences in social and demographic characteristics 
including taste and population. Spain has imported the most quantity of products with their 
associated high monetary values from SSA between 1995 to 2015. Spain is closely followed by 
Finland, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Germany, France and Netherlands in descending order of 
magnitude. Surprisingly, the top importers of heterogenous products from Africa as measured by 
the quantity and value of different products imported are not the richer countries in Europe. 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom are bigger economies in terms of income than Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland but then they import less quantity of products unlike the later.   Figure 4 
illustrates the immediate discussed phenomenon which is the quantity and value of products 
imported by EU 15 from SSA.  
Figure 4: Product Quantity and Value by Importer (EU 15) 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
The quantity of products exported from SSA to the EU 15 as well as the value of products vary by 
industry. Using the HS 2002 classification of products, the variation of quantity of products 
exported by SSA to the EU 15 from 1995 to 2015 is illustrated by a pie chart in figure 5. Mineral 
product exports dominate by a wide margin the quantity of products exported by SSA countries. 
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It represents about 80% or more of total product quantities exported. Other groups of products 
such as Vegetable Products, Prepared Foodstuff (which consists of Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar; 
Tobacco and Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes.), Wood and Articles of Wood; Wood Charcoal;  
Figure 5: Distribution of SSA Product Quantity by Industry  
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Figure 6: Distribution of SSA Product Value by Industry 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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Cork and Articles of Cork; Manufactures of Straw, of Esparto or of other Plaiting Materials; Basket 
Ware and Wickerwork, and Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal have a relatively higher share 
of exports in terms of their quantities exported. The remaining 16 industries have an almost 
insignificant quantity out of the total quantity of products exported by the SSA. 
Figure 6 shows the variation of SSA product export by value. Unlike in figure 5, the mineral 
product industry contributes just about a half to the total value of SSA product exports. The value 
of Prepared Food Stuff, Vegetable Products and Base Metals are higher relative to the quantity 
exported of these commodities. The case is true for Textile and Articles, Arts and Antiques, Live 
Animals and Animal Products, as well as Wood, Cork, and Straw Articles. 
 
By income classification, the variation in exported product value and quantity by LDC and non 
LDC status, reveals an unsurprising outcome. The pattern of product value and quantity exported 
by the SSA in general is not different from the pattern of exported product value and quantity of 
the LDCs and the non LDCs in SSA. Appendices 1 – 4 illustrate the variation of exported product 
quantity and value by both LDCs and non LDCs in SSA. 
 
4.0 Methodology 
 
4.10 Difference-in-Difference Methodology                                                                                                                    
The study employs a difference-in-difference methodology to investigate the impact of the EBA 
arrangement on LDCs in SSA. The difference-in-difference methodology is an impact evaluation 
methodology that is usually used to investigate the impact of a quasi-natural experiment such as 
this study. (World Bank Group & IDB, 2016), discusses the concept of difference-in-difference 
as follows: 
 
“The difference-in-differences method compares the changes in outcomes over time between a 
population that is enrolled in a program (the treatment group) and a population that is not (the 
comparison group). This allows us to correct for any differences between the treatment and 
comparison groups that are constant over time.” 
 
Difference-in-Difference thus compares the difference in an outcome between two units made 
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distinct by the participation of one in a programme by comparing the difference overtime (before 
and after the treatment) for each unit and then the difference of the difference derived overtime 
between the two units. This difference is then explained as the impact of the programme on the 
unit of population that participated in a programme or treatment. This is widely considered as true 
since the methodology provides a counterfactual in the comparison group also known as the 
control group whose outcome is assumed to be outcome of the treated unit or group had the treated 
group not been involved in a supposed programme or treatment. As such, it is required of the two 
groups to be comparable in terms of their outcome before the treatment to be able to attribute the 
difference of the difference between the two units or groups to the programme or treatment. 
 
The discourse by (World Bank Group & IDB, 2016) as shown above underlines a possible 
weakness of the difference-in-difference methodology. This is the fact that the methodology only 
controls for differences that are constant over time. The study thus complements this weakness by 
controlling for several time varying differences between the two groups compared in the study and 
the destination countries of their product exports. 
 
4.20 Selection of Treatment and Control Group of Countries 
Owing to the nature of the difference-in-difference method of impact evaluation, the study uses 
two groups of countries in SSA as treated group and the comparison or control group. By default, 
the treated group consists of SSA LDCs that benefit from the EBA arrangement with the European 
Commission. The control group consists of the remaining SSA countries who do not benefit from 
the EBA arrangement because of their income and development Status. Most of the countries that 
belong to the control group are lower-middle income countries. Six countries in SSA are however 
dropped from the list of treated and control countries for reasons due to the structure of the BACI 
data which is used for the study as well as the assumptions of the difference-indifference 
methodology. Specifically, countries belonging to the Southern African Custom Union (South 
Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) are dropped the reason being that their 
exported product quantity and value are aggregated. Since four out of five of  the countries are non 
LDCs and the remaining one (Lesotho) is an LDC, it becomes difficult to know the exact group 
the Southern African Custom Union should belong to. Another country that is omitted from the 
study is Cape Verde. This is because Cape Verde transitioned from Least Developed Country status 
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to Lower-Middle Income status in 2007. As a result, Cape Verde no longer received special EBA 
treatment from the European Commission making it impossible to look at the impact of the 
treatment on Cape Verde together with the rest of the SSA countries. Since Cape Verde transitioned 
in 2007 and the study period lasts until 2015 which is more than 7 years after their transition, the 
inclusion of Cape Verde could drive the results and thus cause biasedness of the estimate. 
 
One final issue about the treated countries is that of Sudan. Geographically, Sudan is found in the 
North of Africa and as a matter of fact lies in the Sahara zone of the African continent. However, 
Sudan does not possess the characteristics of the North African nations and since it is an LDC, it 
is included in the group of treated countries. In 2011, a new nation of South Sudan was born out 
of Sudan making the number of LDCs in SSA increase by one. For the sake of continuity and to 
avoid and reduce attrition, product exports in terms of their quantity and value of South Sudan are 
added to those of Sudan and the two countries are treated as one country; Sudan. 
 
To sum up, the study has a total of 42 SSA countries out of which 32 are LDCs and belong to the 
treatment group. The 10 remaining countries make up the control group. Since the study uses 
bilateral data, the destination countries are the EU 15 countries but with Belgium and Luxembourg 
put together as one entity as built by the CEPII BACI database. Appendix 5 shows a list of the 
treated, control and EU 15 countries.   
 
4.21 Justification of the Control Group 
 A requirement to avoiding biased results in a difference-in-difference study is the quality of the 
control group. According to (Gerther et al, 2010), the quality of the control group determines the 
quality of the evaluation. Put differently, the success of a difference-in-difference evaluation is tied 
to the quality of the counterfactual which is seen in the control group. For this reason, it is 
important to have a very good control group to trust the outcome of this study. Although it not 
always the case, the parallel trend graph, which is shown in the next section provides proof of the 
quality of the control group. This study goes further to analyze the characteristics of the control 
group vis-à-vis the characteristics of the treatment group to assure the quality of the chosen control 
group. It is the authors view that there are not very significant differences in the two groups of 
countries although they have been designated different development statuses by the United 
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Nations. 
First among the justifications is the fact that some non LDC countries in SSA by all standards meet 
the classification of their economy as least developed. However, these countries have refused the 
classification of their economies by citing the inaccuracy of the data from which the decision to 
downgrade their economies were reached. Two countries from the control group namely, Ghana 
and Zimbabwe are cited as having met LDC status and therefore the need to recognize and accept 
their befitting status (UN, 2016). 
 
The second point of justification concerns mineral product exports from SSA which is mostly 
attributed to countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Gabon all of which belong to the control group 
of countries. This common view is held since Nigeria and Gabon are some of the world’s top crude 
oil producers and belong to the prestigious group of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Ghana, formerly known as the Gold Coast is one of the world’s top gold 
exporters. However, the treatment group has several top minerals producing and exporting 
countries including Angola, which is an OPEC member country and hold the prestigious title of 
being Africa’s second largest producer and exporter of oil after Nigeria and one of the top 10 in 
the world. Angola produced 1755 and 1725 thousand Barrels per day (tb/d) in 2015 and 2016 
respectively whiles Nigeria produced an equivalent of 1839 and 1557 tb/d in 2015 and 2016 
respectfully (OPEC, 2017). Hence, they are not very different in terms of the oil production and 
yet they belong to the different groups. Other top oil producing countries among thee treated group 
are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, and Chad.   
 
The third point of justification of the choice of the control group is the fact that SSA countries do 
not differ with respect to their productivity from both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. 
Due to their reliance on mineral products, most SSA countries suffer from the problem of the Dutch 
disease such that they tend to neglect the other sectors especially the manufacturing sector. The 
issue of low productivity in SSA countries is also due to their relatively poor business environment 
and firm characteristics such as low human capital development, inadequate access to 
manufacturing inputs, limited infrastructure, macroeconomic environment and regulation 
volatility and inefficient government policies (Tybout, 2000) and lack of technical capacity to 
perform as well as reliance on labour intensive production due to technological differences 
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(Söderbom & Teal, 2004). Also they suffer from low or poor management practices resulting from 
lack of competition and the existing ownership structure (Bloom, Mahajan, McKenzie, & Roberts, 
2010). Appendix 6-9 is an illustration of mineral product and non-mineral export by the treatment 
and control group of countries.  
 
4.3 Parallel Trend Assumption 
An important assumption of the difference-in-difference methodology is the Parallel Trend 
Assumption which is also referred to as the Equal Trend Assumption (World Bank Group & IDB, 
2016). The assumption postulates that groups ought to have the same trend prior to the start of the 
treatment so that the two groups can be assumed to be equal or same. By this assumption, changes 
in the trend of the treated after the treatment is attributable to the treatment. The parallel trend also 
shows the counterfactual of the treatment group which is assumed to be the outcome of the 
treatment group in the absence of the treatment. The counterfactual in this case is the trend of the 
control group after the treatment. Figures 7 and 8 show the parallel trend graphs of the treatment 
group and control group at the country level. 
 
Figure 7: Parallel Trend Graph for Exported Product Quantity at Country Level 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
23 
 
 
Figure 8: Parallel Trend Graph for Exported Product Quantity at Country Level 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
From both trend graphs, the treatment group and the control group have a similar trend prior to the 
start of the EBA arrangement in 2001 which is indicated by the red vertical line that cuts through 
both graphs. The trends for the non-treated years before 2001 are almost a perfect one but for a 
mirror reflection for the years 1995-1996 where there was a rise in the quantity of products as well 
as value of products exported by the control group whiles those of the treatment fell by almost the 
same margin.  
 
The years following the commencement of the EBA programme exhibit an almost perfect trend or 
correlation for both groups for the value of their exported products. Surprisingly, even with the 
market access EBA programme, the treatment countries or group saw the value of their exported 
products behind that of the control group just like it used to be before the start of the EBA. 
Regardless, their exported products value increased to levels more than the years before the EBA. 
With respect to exported product quantities, the trends are undulating with some ups and downs 
for both groups. The quantity of exported products of the treated groups fell to a very low level 
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between 2002-2004. The level rose after that period and eventually overtook the quantities 
exported by the treatment countries in 2014 only to fall again to levels below the control group in 
2015.   
 
The fall in importation of products from SSA countries by EU 15 countries seems to be due to 
factors at the global level including a fall in demand of global demand and specifically of trade in 
fuels which is the one of the major component of African mineral exports. Other factors that could 
have caused a fall in African exports are the rise in prices of oil and non-oil fuels, and exchange 
rate depreciation of currencies of major industrial countries. According to (WTO, 2003), reduced 
investment flows, dented business confidence, increased restrictions on international trade 
transactions to reduce risk from terrorism, and rising global tensions among others are contributory 
factors to the fall in global trade including African Exports. 
 
Country differences is not the only heterogeneity that the EBA brings to the SSA-EU trade. The 
EBA prescribed transitional liberalisation for some three products namely Sugar, Fresh Banana, 
and Rice until later and as a result it becomes pertinent to investigate the impact on all products 
using these three products as controls. Due to the difference in the duration of transition for these 
three products, three different controls (Sugar-Rice, Banana, and Arms) are used to study the 
parallel trend of the EBA at the product level. Appendices 10-13 show the trend graphs for two 
controls at the extensive and intensive margins.   
 
4.40 Econometric Specification of the Difference-in-Difference Model  
The econometric estimation of the difference-in-difference methodology of both the evaluation of 
the EBA at the country and product levels is given in general difference-in-Difference literature 
as:    
𝑌 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 +  𝛾𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 +  𝛿( 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒) +  𝜇                                                       (1) 
Where:             Y          = Outcome variable (quantity or value of product exported) 
 Treat   = 1, if the country or product benefits from EBA arrangement 
                                     = 0, if otherwise 
                        Time    = 1, if year is a post EBA treatment period 
                                     = 0, if otherwise 
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      Treat*Time    = 1, if both Treat and Time are equal to 1  
                                       = 0, if either Treat or Time is equal to 0 
                              u       = Error term  
                          β, γ, δ   = Coefficients to be estimated 
                                 α    = Intercept   
 
Following (Álvarez & López, 2008), the Baseline model (1) is enhanced to control for several time 
varying unobserved characteristics of countries and products that could have influenced the 
outcome variables. This specification is given as model (2).  
 
𝑌𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝑡 +  𝛿𝑝 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝑒𝑝𝑐𝑡                                                                           (2) 
Where:            𝑌𝑝𝑐𝑡 = Outcome variable for product p in country c at time t. 
                          𝛿𝑝  = Vector of Product fixed effects  
                          𝛿𝑐  = Vector of country fixed effects 
                         𝛿𝑡  = Vector of time fixed effects  
However, owing to the bilateral nature of the dataset, the model (2) is modified to control for both 
specific and bilateral time varying unobserved factors as demonstrated in (Baier et al., 2014). 
 
The study follows (Chang, Kaltani, & Loayza, 2009) who used variable complementarity to 
investigate the impact of interested independent variables on a dependent variable by interacting 
complementarity variables with the variable of interest. The study uses the interacted variable 
approach to explain the impact of policy complementarity on the EBA arrangement towards 
fulfilling the objectives of the EBA by generating better and significant results. To achieve that 
goal, models (1) and (2) are adjusted to include policy variables and their interaction with the EBA 
treatment variable. The model specification of the complementarity study is given as model (3). 
 
𝑌𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽1𝛥𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝛥𝑐𝑡 +  𝛿𝑝 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑡                                   (3) 
Where:              𝛥𝑐𝑡                 =  A vector of policy variables  
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝛥𝑐𝑡 = interaction of EBA treatment variable and policy variables for         
       country c at time t  
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5.0 Results 
To investigate the impact of the EBA arrangement on the LDC countries, the baseline model (1) is 
estimated at the country level. This is done by eliminating the 3 products that were exempted from 
full liberalisation until the end of their transitional liberalisation. Also eliminated are arms and 
ammunitions that by the EBA arrangement are exempted from tariff free and quota free market 
access in the EU 15. This is done to allow for the countries, both the treated and control countries 
to be comparable at the country level. Two separate regressions are estimated at the country level 
to analyze the impact at on both the extensive and the intensive margins of export. The difference-
in-difference estimator as built in the STATA statistical package is employed for this estimation. 
 
Model (1) is equally estimated by means of the difference-in-difference estimator to investigate 
the impact of the EBA arrangement at the product level. Since there exist three separate timelines 
for the products that are gradually liberalized, three different set of control groups are used. The 
first set of control group for the product level analyses is a group which consists of Sugar and Rice 
Products. The number of years involved with this first set of control group is limited to the years 
before 2010. This is because the control group members became liberalized after 2009. The second 
control group comprises fresh banana which was not fully liberalized until 2006. Just like it is done 
for the first control group, the estimation with the second control group is restricted to years before 
2007.   The third control group consists of the chapter 93 product line of the HS 2002 product 
classification which is arms and ammunitions. Since this product line has never been fully 
liberalized, the years involved when the control group at the product level is arms and ammunitions 
are the full range of years and thus goes until the very last year of the dataset which is 2015.  
 
In each product level estimation, the control groups are mutually exclusive with member products 
of other control groups such that the use of sugar, and rice in the control group rules out the 
presence of banana and Arms in the treatment group. Likewise, the use of banana as a control 
group rules out the presence of rice and sugar and arms in the treatment group. In the case using 
arms and ammunitions as the control, all 3 non-fully liberalized products are exempted from the 
treatment group.  
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The model (2) is estimated to account for combinations of country specific, country bilateral, time, 
and product fixed effects to capture time-varying unobservable factors. Tables 2 and 3 show the 
baseline and fixed effects results for the extensive margin and intensive margin respectfully at the 
country level.   
  
Table 2: Baseline and Fixed Effects Estimation Results for Extensive margin at the Country level 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Time Dummy -0.588***      
 (0.01)      
Country Dummy -0.137***      
 (0.02)      
EBA Treatment -0.038* -0.250*** -0.276*** 0.014 0.014 0.037 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Constant    1.090***      
 (0.01)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer No No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.007 0.042 0.656 0.758 0.758 0.765 
N 515611 515611 498491 472897 472897 472896 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
5.1 Country Level Results 
The result for the extensive margin from the baseline difference-in-difference evaluation is shown 
in column 1 of table 2. The EBA arrangement seems to have an unexpected negative and significant 
impact on the quantity of products exported by the LDCs in SSA. Specifically, the quantity of 
products exported by LDC in SSA has been reduced by 3.8 percent due to the EBA arrangement 
which has been put in place to increase EU market access to products originating from LDCs 
including those in SSA. The result is in tandem with the results of the parallel graphs as discussed 
previously. However, the associated R-squared is low and this calls for the inclusion of some more 
variables as the EBA alone has a weaker explanatory power on the results as derived by the 
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difference-in-difference estimator.  
 
Table 3: Baseline and Fixed Effects Estimation Results for Intensive margin at the Country level 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
As a result, model (2) is estimated by including several fixed effects to model (1) to control for 
possibly all variables that seem to have been omitted in this relationship. The fixed effects included 
are Importer-Year fixed effects (column 2), Products-Year fixed effects (column 3), Products-
Exporter fixed-effects (column 4), Exporter fixed effects (column 5), and Exporter-Importer fixed 
effects.   
 
Importer-Year fixed effects are included to control for factors in the importer countries which are 
the EU 15 countries that vary over time and could have impacted on demand for products from 
SSA countries. These factors include income and population both of which are direct determinants 
of product consumption. Product-Year fixed effects control for such factors that impact on products 
such as a boom in a specific product industry and even their factors of production such increased 
rainfall, irrigation, and research and development. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Time Dummy -0.107***      
 (0.01)      
Country Dummy -0.176***      
 (0.01)      
EBA Treatment 0.048*** -0.160*** -0.235*** 0.031* 0.031* 0.049 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Constant  3.094***      
   (0.01)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer No No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.001 0.021 0.445 0.607 0.607 0.620 
N 525106 525106 507833 481987 481987 481986 
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Product-Exporter fixed effects control for such factors in the exporter countries that impact on the 
export of products including transportation and other infrastructure, improved capital and labour 
and general business environment and a lot more. Exporter fixed effects controls for exporter 
specific factors such as income, population, resource endowment, governance and macroeconomic 
environment. Finally, exporter-importer fixed effects controls for bilateral factors between the 
exporting countries and importing countries such as foreign direct investments from the importer 
to the exporting countries, and exchange rates.  
 
The gradual imposition of the various fixed effects increases the associated R-squared and the 
impact of the EBA arrangement on the quantity of products exported by SSA LDCs from a 
significant negative impact to a positive but insignificant impact.  This suggests that changes in 
the quantity of products exported by SSA LDCs overtime are attributable to other factors other 
than the EBA arrangement and that the EBA has no impact or whatsoever on the quantity of 
products exported by SSA LDCs. 
 
The results for the intensive margin is shown in Table 3. The difference-in-difference estimator as 
shown by column 1 provides a positive and significant impact of the EBA arrangement on the 
value of products exported by SSA LDCs to the EU 15. However, the inclusion of the fixed effects 
as done for the extensive margin erodes the significance of the EBA treatment and thereby suggests 
that the EBA has no impact on the value of products exported by the LDCs in SSA contrary to the 
objective of PTAs and economic and trade theory in general. 
 
Overall, the EBA seems to have no impact on both margins of trade at the country level. However, 
since the dynamics within individual countries and as well industries could differ from that at the 
regional level, it becomes pertinent to look at the evaluations in terms of the specific effect of the 
EBA on each country and industry. Appendices 18, 19, 20 and 21 show the country specific and 
sector specific results.  
 
The country specific results show variations and heterogenous impact of the EBA on the extensive 
and intensive margins of SSA LDCs exports. While the impact is negative and significant for most 
of the LDCs it is positive and significant for some countries including The Gambia for the 
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extensive margin and Central African Republic, Djibouti, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. At the 
industry level, the EBA has heterogenous impact on the two margins just like it does at the 
individual country level. Largely, the EBA has a negative but significant impact on most industries 
except Vegetable Product, Live Animals and Animal Product, Pearls and Jewelry, and Footwear, 
Headgear, Umbrellas and Feather industries for both margins. 
 
The heterogenous nature of the impact of the EBA on both margins for both the country and 
industry levels calls for the investigation of specific reasons as to why some countries and 
industries benefit while others do not. It is the author’s opinion that specific factors that exist in 
specific countries and industries have led to these positive impacts and thus the need to conduct 
complementarity analyses of the EBA on the two margins of export.  
 
5.2 Product Level Results 
The results for the difference-in-difference estimator together with those for the fixed effects 
estimations are shown for the extensive margin and intensive margin respectfully. Tables 4 and 5 
show the results for which sugar and rice are used as the control group.   
 
Table 4: Impact of the EBA on the Extensive margin at the Product level (Sugar -Rice as Control) 
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Time Dummy -0.099      
 (0.18)      
Product Dummy -4.026***      
 (0.14)      
EBA Treatment -0.371* -4.334*** -53654.882 3428.024 3478.588 7002.738 
 (0.18) (0.11) (1.06e+09) (44607590.65) (44607590.64) (14356998.56) 
Constant   5.050***      
 (0.14)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer No No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.011 0.044 0.665 0.773 0.773 0.781 
N 358438 358438 345859 322262 322262 322257 
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From table 4, column 1 shows the results for the difference-in-difference estimator while columns 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the results for the various fixed effects as explained previously. The impact 
of the EBA on the extensive margin for exported products is negative and significant such that the 
EBA reduces the quantity of products exported by the LDCs to the EU 15. To be specific, the EBA 
reduces the quantity exported by SSA LDCs by 37.1% at the 5% significance level. However, just 
like at the country level, the impact by the difference-in-difference estimator vanishes when the 
fixed effects as explained are imposed such that the EBA impact turns positive but insignificant. 
Therefore, at the product level when the control group consists of sugar and rice products, the 
impact of the EBA on the extensive margin is negative. From Table 5, the impact on the intensive 
margin is shown. The difference-in-difference estimator provides a negative but insignificant 
coefficient. The coefficient of the EBA treatment remains unchanged after the control of all the 
other factors that are likely to impact on the outcome of the coefficient. As a result, the EBA has 
no impact on the intensive margin of trade of SSA LDCs 
 
Table 5: Estimation Results for the Intensive margin at the Product level (Sugar and Rice as Control) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
The estimation of the impact at the product level with the other two sets of control groups which 
are made up of fresh banana on one hand and arms and ammunitions on the other hand provide the 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Time Dummy 0.020      
 (0.12)      
Product Dummy -2.014***      
 (0.09)      
EBA -0.131 -2.121*** 56804.764 6882.200 7117.305 2070.830 
 (0.12) (0.08) (9.98e+08) (40080190.90) (40080190.88) (23589655.50) 
Constant   5.024***      
 (0.09)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer No No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.004 0.023 0.443 0.617 0.617 0.631 
N 366949 366949 354221 330331 330331 330326 
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same results as given by the sugar and rice group. Hence, with such a consistent result using 3 
different set of control groups, it is can be concluded that the EBA has not impacted on both the 
extensive and intensive margins measured at the product level. Appendices 14-17 show the results 
of the EBA for both the extensive and intensive margins using banana and arms and ammunitions 
the control groups respectively. 
 
5.3 Complementarity Analyses  
Following the derivation of a rather unexpected insignificant impact of the EBA on the extensive 
and intensive margins of SSA LDC exports, the study goes a step further to investigate several 
complementary policies that SSA LDCs could implement to benefit from the EBA arrangement. It 
is the believe of the author that the LDCs have not benefited from the EBA with respect to their 
trade margins because of the existence of inefficiencies in their individual economies and not 
necessarily that the EBA as a market access policy is ineffective. LDCs, like their name suggests 
are the poorest among all countries and as such do not have the best of resources to facilitate trade. 
The study thus investigates how the improvement in key factors as infrastructure, human capital, 
physical investment, and financial access could increase the quantity and value of products that 
LDCs export to the European common market.   
 
Infrastructure is very relevant for the production process from the start to the delivery of the 
products final consumers. Hence, infrastructure in such sectors as transportation is crucial for the 
export business such that its improvement would lead to an increase in the quantity of products 
that are exported to destination markets ceteris paribus. Transportation infrastructure includes road 
networks, airports, railway networks and sea ports. To explore the complementarity link of 
infrastructure with the EBA, the study resorts to the mobile cellular subscription data from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) to proxy infrastructure.   
 
Physical investment in this context refers to all forms of physical assets apart from those involved 
in transportation. Such investments include machinery and plants and all sort of capital that go into 
the production process including buildings and vehicles. Physical investments work the same way 
as described for transportation infrastructure above. Physical investment is proxied by gross capital 
physical formation data from the WDI. 
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Human capital is one of such inputs of the production process that is indispensable. From the 
theory of marginal physical productivity, human capital is directly linked to production such that 
the higher the level of human capital accumulated by an individual or country, the more productive 
they become ceteris paribus. Human capital for this complementarity analyses is measured by the 
total secondary school enrollment of countries. 
 
Financial access is included in the policy complementarity analyses for the simple reason that there 
exists a high financial requirement in the export business. This financial requirement is due to the 
presence of such costs as shipment cost, and insurance. As a result, only firms that are financially 
sound can export and vice versa. The analyses use domestic credit provided by financial sector (% 
of GDP) data from the WDI to measure a country level of financial access.  
 
Model (3) is used to investigate the complementarity impact of these policies on the EBA towards 
realizing improvements in the extensive and intensive margins of LDC exports.  Tables 6 and 7 
present the results for the extensive and intensive margins respectively for model (3) using the 
policies variables described above.  
 
Tables 6 and 7 show the coefficients for the EBA treatment variable, the policy variables and those 
of their interaction with the EBA treatment variable. As discussed, the interaction variables which 
indicate the presence of those policies in the EBA regime are all positive and significant. This 
indicates that the EBA arrangement would impact on the extensive and intensive margins of the 
SSA LDCs in the presence of improved and increased transportation infrastructure, other physical 
investments, increased human capital accumulation and increased access to finance to meet the 
financial requirements of production and export. The net effect of the interaction variables and the 
EBA treatment variable are however negative and this signifies the need for aggressive 
improvements in these policy areas to ensure positive impact of the EBA on the margins of trade. 
 
Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 illustrate the marginal effects of the EBA on the trade margins in the 
presence of these policies. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results for Complementarity Impact of the EBA on the Extensive Margin 
 
Table 7: Estimation Results for Complementarity Impact of the EBA on the Intensive Margin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Intensive Intensive Intensive Intensive 
 Margin Margin Margin Margin 
EBA  -0.887*** -0.234*** -0.950*** -0.381*** 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) 
EBA*Investment 0.255***    
 (0.02)    
Investment -0.131***    
 (0.01)    
EBA*Infrastructure  0.039***   
  (0.00)   
Infrastructure  -0.011***   
  (0.00)   
EBA*Human Capital   0.251***  
   (0.02)  
Human Capital   -0.062***  
   (0.01)  
EBA*Credit Access    0.072*** 
    (0.01) 
Credit Access    -0.076*** 
    (0.00) 
Constant 3.378*** 3.028*** 3.183*** 3.256*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) 
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Observations 504746 509862 321078 498833 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Extensive Extensive Extensive Extensive 
 Margin Margin Margin Margin 
EBA  -1.404*** -0.406*** -3.168*** -2.105*** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.10) (0.04) 
EBA*Investment 0.367***    
 (0.02)    
Investment -0.510***    
 (0.01)    
EBA*Infrastructure  0.055***   
  (0.01)   
Infrastructure  -0.119***   
  (0.00)   
EBA*Human Capital   0.778***  
   (0.03)  
Human Capital   -0.668***  
   (0.01)  
EBA*Credit Access    0.530*** 
    (0.01) 
Credit Access    -0.432*** 
    (0.01) 
Constant 2.200*** 0.937*** 3.133*** 2.197*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
R-squared 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Observations 495907 501063 315317 489665 
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Figure 9: The Conditional Marginal Effects of the EBA in the Presence of Investments 
  
Panel A: Extensive Margin                              Panel B: Intensive Margin 
Figure 10: The Conditional Marginal Effects of the EBA in the Presence of Infrastructure 
  
Panel A: Extensive Margin                              Panel B: Intensive Margin 
Figure 11: The Conditional Marginal Effects of the EBA with Human Capita Development 
  
Panel A: Extensive Margin                                Panel B: Intensive Margin 
36 
 
Figure 12: The Conditional Marginal Effects of the EBA with Credit Access 
  
Panel A: Extensive Margin                                Panel B: Intensive Margin 
 
The above marginal effect figures show the complementarity effect of four policy variables and 
EBA on the extensive and intensive margins of SSA LDC exports. To summarize, the EBA can 
have a positive and significant impact on the trade margins of SSA LDCs but only in the presence 
of some policies which happen to be above a certain threshold as illustrated above in the figures 
at the point of intersection of the red horizontal line and the positively sloping blue line. Therefore, 
SSA LDCs should improve on some trade related policies including those discussed above so that 
they can benefit from an improved extensive and intensive margin owing to the EBA.  
 
5.4 Discussion of Results  
Following the econometric estimations above, it has been shown that the EBA has not impacted 
on the extensive and intensive margins of LDCs in SSA both at the country and product levels. 
The difference-in-difference estimator provides a negative impact of the EBA on the extensive 
margin while it provides a positive impact on the intensive margin. However, the difference-in-
difference estimator controls only for factors that are constant overtime such that the fixed effect 
estimator was used to control for several time-varying factors leading to the rather surprising result 
of no impact of the EBA. This could be due to several factors including low standards and quality 
of exports of SSA LDCs which makes their products restricted from the EU market even though 
there exists free entry into the market. 
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Regardless of the outcome of the difference-in-difference and fixed effect estimations, the impact 
of the EBA has been shown to vary among countries and industries with some countries 
experiencing a positive impact while others experienced a negative and insignificant impact.  This 
called for an investigation into the factors within those countries that could lead to a positive impact 
of the EBA on the trade margins of LDCs in SSA. The resulting complementarity analyses shows 
that the EBA has the capacity to affect the trade margins of the LDCs in SSA if and only if they 
improve their production and export capacity to a level that would allow them to respond to the 
tariff free and quota free European market access that the EBA guarantees. It is the belief of the 
author that the EBA has not impacted on the extensive and intensive margins due to the nature of 
their economies as LDCs. As a result, an improvement in policy environment to ensure human 
capital development, infrastructural development, access to financial credits and increased 
physical investment would allow the extensive and intensive margins of exports of SSA LDCs to 
respond the EBA. 
 
The results are consistent with (Spilker et al., 2017) who found no significant impact of the 
Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade Agreement on Costa Rican 
exports to the USA and (Gamberoni, 2007) who found that unilateral trade preferences do not 
impact on exports from LDCs.  
 
5.5 Robustness Tests 
Several reasons as identified with the study could lead to biased results owing to endogeneity. The 
sources of endogeneity identified include that which arises due to the selection criteria of countries 
and the groups used for the difference-in-difference impact evaluation. The first reason is that 
country selection was not randomly done. Member countries of the two groups were selected based 
on their income status as LDCs and non LDCs and not for any other reason. Also, the LDC 
countries and even the EBA policy itself were implemented due to the prior success of similar 
programmes elsewhere. Due to these reasons, there could be biased results which might not 
necessarily reflect the impact of PTAs in general.  
 
Secondly, there could be an omitted variable effect such that some relevant factors that affects the 
outcome variables are left out of the analysis. This could lead to an incorrect outcome for the 
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analyses.  
Thirdly, the results could be driven by the dominance of mineral products especially from the 
control group as well as Nigeria which happens to be a super exporter among the SSA countries 
and as a result an outlier.  
 
For these reasons, the study checks the robustness of the results by dropping Nigeria and mineral 
products from the analyses. Finally, some control variables including the gravity model variables 
of distance, common language, and colonial relationship between the origin and destination 
countries are added. Other variables apart from those of the gravity variables are included.   
 
The results for both the extensive and intensive margins are robust to the inclusion some more 
control variable including distance between countries, common language, colonial relationship, 
infrastructure in the exporting country as well as political rights and population of both importer 
and exporter. The results remain insignificant for both margins except that that of the intensive 
margin changes sign from positive to negative. Appendix 22 shows the results for the inclusion of 
control variables.  
 
The results are also robust to the exclusion of an outlier country in the country group which is 
Nigeria. Results for both margins are robust as shown in appendices 23 and 24. The results are 
also robust to dropping mineral products, a product which dominates by a huge margin in both 
groups. 
 
5.6 Limitation of the Study 
The study is limited to an extent by the choice of impact evaluation methodology which is the 
difference-in-difference. This methodology limited the study to only the EU -15 countries as 
bilateral trade partners of SSA countries in the EU common market. This is because the 
membership of the EU has changed since 2001. As a result, the methodology could not afford to 
include the new member countries since their market did not allow free entry of LDC exports. 
Their inclusion would therefore lead to an upward bias of the impact of the EBA. Another 
limitation to the study comes from the BACI database. The data aggregates the export values and 
quantity of five SSA countries of different income status into one: The South African Custom 
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Union (SACU). Since the methodology requires the use of different groups and the data puts these 
five members of the different statuses together, the data reduces the sample size of the study by 5 
countries as these countries are eliminated to make possible a difference-in-difference evaluation. 
It is the authors view that the inclusion of more EU countries and the SACU countries to the sample 
size could boost the validity and reliability of the results. 
 
5.7 Directions for further studies 
The study attributes the insignificant impact of the EBA to missing policy complementarities in 
the LDCs in SSA. However, this is not all that there as other factors could be responsible and thus 
calls for further research into the causes of the low response of SSA LDC exports to the EU market. 
A rule of origin was included in the EBA in 2009. Since LDCs depend on intermediate inputs and 
more to produce their final products, it will be interesting to investigate the impact of the rule of 
origin as prescribed in the EBA on extensive and intensive margins of the trade of LDCs. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The study sought to investigate the impact of the EBA on the extensive and intensive margins of 
export of LDCs in SSA to the EU market. It employed a difference-in-difference methodology 
together with the fixed effects estimator as well as the BACI bilateral exports data for thirty-two 
LDCs in SSA, ten non LDCs in SSA and 15 EU countries to investigate the topic for years 1995-
2015. The study finds no impact of the EBA on the 2 margins of trade of the LDCs in SSA both at 
the country level and product level. It however finds heterogenous impact of the EBA on individual 
countries and industries such that it proceeds to do a complementarity analyses to know the 
existence of some factors that causes a favorable outcome for some countries and industries and 
unfavorable outcomes for others. Following, a complementarity study of some policy variables, 
the study recommends to LDCs in SSA to improve their state of physical investment, human 
capital, credit access, and infrastructure to benefit from the EBA. 
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Appendix 1: Distribution of LDC Exported Product Quantity by Industry 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Appendix 2: Distribution of Non LDC Exported Product Quantity by Industry 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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Appendix 3: Distribution of LDC Exported Product Value by Industry 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Appendix 4: Distribution of Non LDC Exported Product Value by Industry 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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Appendix 5: Table of Treatment, Control, and EU 15 countries 
 Treatment Group Control Group  EU 15 
       
1 Angola 1 Cameroon 1 Austria 
2 Benin 2 Congo Republic 2 Belgium  
3 Burkina Faso 3 Cote d'Ivoire  3 Denmark 
4 Burundi 4 Gabon  4 Finland 
5 Central African Republic 5 Ghana  5 France 
6 Chad 6 Kenya  6 Germany 
7 Comoros 7 Mauritius  7 Greece 
8 Congo, Dem. Rep. 8 Nigeria  8 Ireland 
9 Djibouti 9 Seychelles 9 Italy 
10 Equatorial Guinea 10 Zimbabwe 10 Luxembourg 
11 Eritrea    11 Netherlands 
12 Ethiopia    12 Portugal 
13 Guinea    13 Spain 
14 Liberia    14 Sweden 
15 Madagascar   15 
United 
Kingdom  
16 Malawi      
17 Mali      
18 Mauritania     
19 Mozambique     
20 Niger      
21 Rwanda      
22 Sao Tome and Principe    
23 Senegal      
24 Sierra Leone     
25 Somalia      
26 Sudan      
27 Tanzania      
28 Togo      
28 Uganda      
30 Zambia      
31 Gambia, The     
32 Guinea-Bissau     
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Appendix 6: Distribution of Mineral Product Export by SSA LDCs 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Appendix 7: Distribution of Mineral Product Export by SSA Non LDCs 
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Source: Author’s Calculation 
Appendix 8: Distribution of Non-Mineral Product Export by SSA LDCs 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Appendix 9: Distribution of Non-Mineral Product Export by SSA Non LDCs 
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Source: Author’s Calculation 
Appendix 10: Trend Graph for Exported Product Quantity at Product Level (Sugar and Rice as Controls) 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Appendix 11: Trend Graph for Exported Product Value at Product Level (Sugar and Rice as Controls) 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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Appendix 12: Trend Graph for Exported Product Quantity at Product Level (Banana as Control) 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
Appendix 13: Trend Graph for Exported Product Value at Product Level (Banana Control) 
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Source: Author’s Calculation 
Appendix 14: Estimation Results for the Extensive margin at the Product level (Banana as Control) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
 
Appendix 15: Estimation Results for the Intensive margin at the Product level (Banana as Control) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Time Dummy 0.405      
 (0.29)      
Product Dummy -3.474***      
 (0.18)      
EBA Treatment -0.805** -4.346*** -1459636.495 -4906.988 -4809.946 10111.213 
 (0.29) (0.22) (6.03e+09) (61988926.63) (61988926.63) (31304744.99) 
Constant 4.498***      
 (0.18)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x 
Importer 
No No No No No Yes 
r2 0.006 0.041 0.669 0.782 0.782 0.790 
N 274304 274304 264147 242425 242425 242420 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Time Dummy 0.577**      
 (0.19)      
Product Dummy -
1.368*** 
     
 (0.12)      
EBA Treatment -
0.723*** 
-2.151*** -891145.218 -3800.663 -4048.473 6378.485 
 (0.19) (0.15) (5.17e+09) (46523161.68) (46523161.68) (16883141.80) 
Constant 4.378***      
 (0.12)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer No No No No No Yes 
r2 0.002 0.021 0.444 0.626 0.626 0.641 
N 281742 281742 271451 249448 249448 249443 
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Source: Author’s Calculation 
Appendix 16: Estimation Results for the Extensive margin at the Product level (Arms as Control) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
Appendix 17: Estimation Results for the Intensive margin at the Product level (Arms as Control) 
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Time Dummy 0.753      
 (0.42)      
Product Dummy 2.962***      
 (0.36)      
EBA Treatment -1.364** 1.430*** 1800854.731 -11320.209 -11441.522 -17200.765 
 (0.42) (0.22) (5.27e+09) (61168507.12) (61168507.13) (17043184.39) 
Constant -1.938***      
 (0.36)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer No No No No No Yes 
r2 0.007 0.041 0.655 0.758 0.758 0.766 
N 515936 515936 498734 473059 473059 473058 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Time Dummy 0.646*      
 (0.27)      
Product Dummy 0.633**      
 (0.23)      
EBA Treatment -0.734** -0.208 -5144442.047 -665.785 -437.880 3851.703 
 (0.27) (0.15) (4.80e+09) (44830832.91) (44830832.91) (19825402.38) 
Constant 2.377***      
 (0.23)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer No No No No No Yes 
r2 0.000 0.020 0.444 0.607 0.607 0.620 
N 525441 525441 508087 482156 482156 482155 
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Appendix 18: Country Specific Results for the Extensive Margin of LDC exports  
Country EBA 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Constant Standard 
Error 
R-
squared 
observations 
Angola -0.767*** -0.1 -0.032 -0.09 0.007 9081 
Benin -0.676*** -0.09 1.389*** -0.08 0.009 6019 
Burkina Faso -0.211** -0.06 0.185*** -0.05 0.001 9246 
Burundi -0.778*** -0.14 1.090*** -0.11 0.012 2506 
Central African 
Republic 
0.005 -0.12 0.887*** -0.09 0 3552 
Chad -2.079*** -0.28 1.347*** -0.25 0.046 1332 
Comoros -0.161 -0.11 -0.155 -0.1 0.001 2891 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -0.918*** -0.11 1.636*** -0.09 0.012 6147 
Djibouti -0.664*** -0.13 0.537*** -0.1 0.012 2043 
Equatorial Guinea -1.272*** -0.21 2.026*** -0.18 0.012 2721 
Eritrea -0.357** -0.14 0.153 -0.11 0.003 1925 
Ethiopia -1.076*** -0.07 1.174*** -0.07 0.014 16400 
Guinea -0.619*** -0.09 1.594*** -0.07 0.006 7038 
Liberia -1.273*** -0.18 2.609*** -0.15 0.019 2796 
Madagascar -0.541*** -0.03 0.658*** -0.03 0.007 39243 
Malawi -0.815*** -0.1 1.407*** -0.08 0.011 6009 
Mali -0.077 -0.07 0.241*** -0.06 0 10004 
Mauritania -0.351** -0.12 1.387*** -0.1 0.002 5977 
Mozambique -0.644*** -0.1 1.198*** -0.09 0.004 8815 
Niger -0.109 -0.08 -
0.381*** 
-0.07 0 6753 
Rwanda -0.712*** -0.14 0.674*** -0.13 0.008 3418 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
-0.888*** -0.15 0.654*** -0.12 0.019 1985 
Senegal -0.511*** -0.05 1.204*** -0.04 0.005 27662 
Sierra Leone 0 -0.06 0.043 -0.05 0 10049 
Somalia -0.267 -0.18 0.400** -0.14 0.002 1063 
Sudan -1.533*** -0.1 2.333*** -0.07 0.039 6140 
Tanzania -0.725*** -0.05 1.220*** -0.04 0.009 21965 
Uganda -0.989*** -0.07 1.243*** -0.06 0.014 13016 
Togo -0.475 0.06 1.118*** 0.48 0.0001 9545 
Zambia -1.113*** -0.07 1.182*** -0.06 0.023 9501 
Gambia, The 0.194* -0.09 0.668*** -0.07 0.001 4085 
Guinea-Bissau -0.494* -0.2 1.668*** -0.16 0.006 983 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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Appendix 19: Country Specific Results for the Extensive Margin of LDC exports  
Country EBA 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  
Constant Standard 
Error 
R-
Squared 
Observations 
Angola -0.237*** -0.06 2.813*** -0.05 0.002 9163 
Benin -0.222*** -0.06 2.722*** -0.05 0.003 6133 
Burkina Faso 0.114** -0.04 2.368*** -0.03 0.001 9407 
Burundi -0.234* -0.1 2.908*** -0.08 0.002 2585 
Central African 
Republic 
0.188* -0.07 2.778*** -0.06 0.002 3691 
Chad -0.838*** -0.19 3.630*** -0.17 0.018 1343 
Comoros 0.149 -0.08 2.266*** -0.07 0.001 2907 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -0.204** -0.07 3.461*** -0.06 0.001 6443 
Djibouti 0.236** -0.08 2.347*** -0.06 0.004 2072 
Equatorial Guinea 0.116 -0.13 3.326*** -0.11 0 2748 
Eritrea -0.265** -0.09 2.606*** -0.07 0.005 1944 
Ethiopia -0.422*** -0.05 3.283*** -0.05 0.005 16516 
Guinea 0.017 -0.06 3.042*** -0.04 0 7221 
Liberia -0.422*** -0.11 3.829*** -0.09 0.005 2875 
Madagascar 0.031 -0.02 2.964*** -0.02 0 39600 
Malawi -0.222*** -0.06 3.244*** -0.05 0.002 6079 
Mali 0.173*** -0.04 2.408*** -0.04 0.002 10143 
Mauritania -0.001 -0.07 3.330*** -0.06 0 6026 
Mozambique 0.172** -0.06 3.046*** -0.05 0.001 9317 
Niger -0.109 -0.08 -0.381*** -0.07 0 6753 
Rwanda -0.273** -0.09 2.917*** -0.08 0.003 3470 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
-0.103 -0.09 2.347*** -0.08 0.001 1995 
Senegal -0.175*** -0.03 2.954*** -0.03 0.001 27821 
Sierra Leone 0.161*** -0.04 2.483*** -0.03 0.001 10217 
Somalia -0.225 -0.12 2.661*** -0.09 0.004 1071 
Sudan -0.478*** -0.06 3.620*** -0.05 0.01 6193 
Tanzania -0.085** -0.03 3.117*** -0.03 0 22355 
Togo 0.179*** 0.04 2.55 0.03 0.001 9744 
Uganda -0.256*** -0.05 3.164*** -0.04 0.002 13116 
Zambia -1.113*** -0.07 1.182*** -0.06 0.023 9501 
Gambia, The -0.123** -0.05 3.190*** -0.04 0.001 10013 
Guinea-Bissau -0.001 -0.06 2.336*** -0.05 0 4218 
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Appendix 20: Impact of the EBA on Specific industry for the Extensive margin 
Industry EBA Standard 
Error 
Constant Standard 
Error 
R-sq N 
 ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS -0.852*** -0.09 3.471*** -0.05 0.021 4246 
ART and ANTIQUES  0.089 -0.07 -1.300*** -0.06 0 4611 
CHEMICAL OR ALLIED INDUSTRIES -0.391*** -0.05 0.504*** -0.03 0.004 16871 
FOOTWEAR, HEADGEAR,UMBRELLAS,FEATHERS  0.238*** -0.06 -0.760*** -0.03 0.003 6051 
HIDES, SKINS, LEATHER -0.096 -0.05 0.762*** -0.03 0 13649 
INSTRUMENTS -0.217*** -0.03 -2.636*** -0.02 0.002 27927 
 LIVE ANIMALS; ANIMAL PRODUCTS 0.120*** -0.03 1.699*** -0.02 0 29382 
MACHINES -0.193*** -0.02 -1.567*** -0.01 0.001 100195 
MANUFACTURED ARTICLES  -0.094** -0.03 -0.290*** -0.02 0 17499 
Mineral Products -0.689*** -0.1 5.805*** -0.06 0.005 9846 
PEARLS, JEWELLERY 0.159* -0.07 -2.567*** -0.05 0.001 7067 
PLASTICS AND RUBBER -1.427*** -0.05 1.997*** -0.03 0.041 14739 
 PREPARED FOODSTUFFS -0.746*** -0.04 3.589*** -0.02 0.012 28838 
 STONE, CERAMIC, GLASS  -0.374*** -0.06 0.422*** -0.03 0.005 8101 
TEXTILE AND ARTICLES -0.191*** -0.02 0.307*** -0.01 0.001 73586 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENTS -0.009 -0.04 0.194*** -0.02 0 18919 
VEGETABLE PRODUCTS 0.027 -0.02 2.658*** -0.01 0 62126 
 WOOD, CORK, STRAW ARTICLES -1.642*** -0.04 3.750*** -0.02 0.05 29779 
 WOOD-PULP, PAPER, PRINTS  -0.257*** -0.05 0.245*** -0.03 0.002 11286 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
Appendix 21: Impact of the EBA on Specific Industry for the Intensive Margin 
Industry EBA Standard 
Error 
Constant Standard 
Error 
R-sq N 
 ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS -0.331*** -0.07 3.797*** -0.05 0.005 4258 
ART and ANTIQUES  -0.081* -0.04 2.061*** -0.03 0.001 6071 
CHEMICAL OR ALLIED INDUSTRIES -0.01 -0.03 2.523*** -0.02 0 17089 
FOOTWEAR,HEADGEAR,UMBRELLAS,FEATHERS  0.359*** -0.05 1.998*** -0.03 0.01 6123 
HIDES, SKINS, LEATHER -0.129*** -0.04 3.259*** -0.02 0.001 13763 
INSTRUMENTS -0.134*** -0.02 2.218*** -0.01 0.002 28725 
 LIVE ANIMALS; ANIMAL PRODUCTS 0.331*** -0.03 3.519*** -0.02 0.005 29602 
MACHINES -0.025* -0.01 2.154*** -0.01 0 101100 
MANUFACTURED ARTICLES  -0.146*** -0.02 2.041*** -0.02 0.002 17598 
Mineral Products -0.255*** -0.08 5.216*** -0.05 0.001 9950 
PEARLS, JEWELLERY 0.087 -0.05 3.409*** -0.03 0 10304 
PLASTICS AND RUBBER -0.951*** -0.04 3.427*** -0.03 0.034 14791 
 PREPARED FOODSTUFFS -0.409*** -0.03 4.255*** -0.02 0.005 28956 
 STONE, CERAMIC, GLASS  -0.183*** -0.03 1.922*** -0.02 0.004 8174 
TEXTILE AND ARTICLES -0.168*** -0.02 3.100*** -0.01 0.001 74181 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENTS -0.007 -0.03 2.832*** -0.02 0 19195 
VEGETABLE PRODUCTS 0.183*** -0.02 3.473*** -0.01 0.001 62347 
 WOOD, CORK, STRAW ARTICLES -1.066*** -0.03 4.120*** -0.02 0.038 30473 
 WOOD-PULP, PAPER,PRINTS  -0.172*** -0.03 2.157*** -0.02 0.002 11350 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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Appendix 22: Robustness Test with Control Variables 
 (1) (2) 
 Extensive Intensive 
 Margin Margin 
Exporter Population 0.317 0.900* 
 (0.51) (0.37) 
Importer Population 3.512 -2.996 
 (6.79) (2.77) 
Political Rights 0.006 0.040 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
Infrastructure -0.019 -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
simple distance  0.032 -0.049 
 (354.47) (440.34) 
colonial relationship 57.799 16.083 
 (1792117.52) (1326222.18) 
common language -57.516 -94.651 
 (1711888.25) (1361286.97) 
EBA Dummy  0.017 -0.045 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
Importer x Year Yes Yes 
Product x Year Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter Yes Yes 
Exporter Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer Yes Yes 
r2 0.765 0.621 
N 455412.000 463848.000 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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Appendix 23: Robustness Test for the Extensive Margin Without Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Time Dummy -0.541***      
 (0.02)      
Country Dummy -0.083***      
 (0.02)      
EBA -0.084*** -0.243*** -0.270*** -0.001 -0.001 0.025 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Constant 1.037***      
 (0.01)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer No No No No No Yes 
R-squqred 0.007 0.041 0.657 0.760 0.760 0.768 
N 483961 483961 466713 441992 441992 441991 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Appendix 24: Robustness Results for the Intensive Margin without Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DD FE FE FE FE FE 
       
Year Dummy -0.107***      
 (0.01)      
Country Dummy -0.158***      
 (0.01)      
EBA 0.047*** -0.146*** -0.232*** 0.034** 0.034** 0.054 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Constant 3.076***      
 (0.01)      
Importer x Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product x Exporter No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter No No No No Yes Yes 
Exporter x Importer No No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.001 0.020 0.444 0.605 0.605 0.619 
N 492843 492843 475465 450493 450493 450492 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Source: Authors Calculation 
